


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4 August 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed NRO Agreement

1. The attached is a draft NRO agreement which resulted from discussions with Dr. Fubini and Mr. Vance. The draft has been altered substantially from the original draft.

2. The net result of the change resulting from discussions with Dr. Fubini is to reduce the NRO pretty much to the status of a staff with no line responsibility (always an objective in our negotiations). Research, development and production of "sensors" (e.g., cameras) will be done by the "component of the Government best equipped" to do so (hopefully, in large measure, by CIA). Boosters, spacecraft and reentry vehicles will be generally assigned to the Air Force for development purposes. Allocation of responsibility for ongoing systems will be made prior to the execution of any agreement.


3. DDS&T feels strongly that the proposed agreement is unacceptable as the interrelationship between "sensors" and spacecraft and reentry vehicles is so close that responsibility for one is meaningless without authority to develop the other. In other words he feels that the Agency must be given authority to develop and produce the whole "payload" package which includes space and reentry vehicles as well as "sensors." To some extent DDS&T's concern, it seems to me, is mitigated by language appearing at the

NRO review(s)
completed.

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bottom of D. 1. 4., which is supposed to ensure that spacecraft are designed to accommodate sensors rather than vice versa.

4. A major contentious issue in the draft is language in paragraph B (1, 2, 3 and 4) which provides that the Secretary of Defense will have the ultimate responsibility for management of the NRO; would choose the DNRO who will report to the Secretary of Defense; and will "have the final power" to approve the NRP budget. Personally, I think that this language merely recognizes reality and should be accepted subject to some provision specifically recognizing the authority of the Executive Committee. Similarly, language in paragraph E. 2. gives the DNRO "responsibility for managing the NRO and executing the NRP" subject to direction and control of the Secretary of Defense and the guidance of the Executive Committee. Here again, I think that CIA should be able to live with this language and will find adequate protection from:

a. An effective DDNRO appointed from CIA; and

b. A reasonably friendly, patriotic and responsible new leadership in the Air Force in the form of Messrs. Brown, Paul and Flax.

5. I would recommend adoption of the proposed agreement provided there is prior agreement that CIA's responsibility for the following projects is recognized.

a. Operational control of the IDEALIST and OXCART programs;


b. Production and improvement of CORONA payloads;

c. Design, development and production of 


and

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
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d. Development and production of a new general search program.

JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

Attachment
Draft NRO Agreement (31/7/65)

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